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1429 
RETURN TO SENDER: EVALUATING THE 
MEDICAL REPATRIATIONS OF UNINSURED 
IMMIGRANTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2000, Luis Alberto Jimenez, an undocumented and uninsured 
immigrant, sustained traumatic brain injuries in a car accident with an 
intoxicated Floridian driver.
1
 After the accident, he was hospitalized at 
Martin Memorial Medical Center, a private community hospital in Stuart, 
Florida.
2
 Because Jimenez, who remained incapacitated, required ongoing 
care but lacked medical insurance, Martin Memorial was unable to find a 
rehabilitation facility willing to accept him.
3
 Instead, Jimenez remained as 
a ward of the hospital for several years at a cost exceeding $1.5 million.
4
 
Of this $1.5 million, Martin Memorial collected only $80,000 from 
Medicaid for the emergency services rendered to Jimenez; the hospital 
absorbed the remaining costs associated with his care.
5
 Faced with both 
Jimenez‘s continuing medical needs and the financial costs borne of this 
care, Martin Memorial secured a state court order to authorize the hospital 
to transport Jimenez to a medical facility in Guatemala, his country of 
origin.
6
 Acting under this court order, which was later deemed invalid on 
appeal,
7
 the hospital leased an air ambulance at its expense and forcibly 
transported Jimenez back to Guatemala.
8
  
Martin Memorial‘s actions in returning Jimenez to his country of origin 
do not represent an isolated incident.
9
 Instead, through a practice known as 
 
 
 1. Deborah Sontag, Deported, by U.S. Hospitals: Immigrants, Spurned on Rehabilitation, Are 
Forced Out, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2008, at A1. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. (noting that ―[m]any American hospitals are taking it upon themselves to repatriate 
seriously injured or ill immigrants because they cannot find nursing homes willing to accept them 
without insurance‖). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Bruce Patsner, Repatriation of Uninsured Immigrants by U.S. Hospitals: The Jimenez Case, 
HEALTH L. PERSP., Dec. 16, 2008, at 1, http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/2008/(BP)%20 
deport.pdf.  
 6. Id. 
 7. See Montejo v. Martin Mem‘l Med. Ctr., Inc., 874 So. 2d 654, 658 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) 
(holding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to authorize Jimenez‘s transportation to 
Guatemala). 
 8. Sontag, supra note 1. Jimenez‘s cousin, Montejo Gaspar Montejo, was appointed as his legal 
guardian. Id. Despite Montejo‘s opposition to Martin Memorial‘s request to return Jimenez to 
Guatemala, after a hearing in June 2003, a Florida Circuit Court authorized Jimenez‘s relocation. Id.  
 9. Id. (noting that the Guatemalan foreign ministry reported fifty-three repatriations conducted 
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medical repatriation, some hospitals return indigent immigrant patients 
who are ineligible for long-term Medicaid to their countries of origin to 
reduce the financial burdens associated with their uncompensated care.
10
 
Indeed, international medical repatriations have emerged as a creative 
response to the financial conundrum imposed upon hospitals
11
 by virtue of 
immigration and health care policies. Collectively, these policies restrict 
immigrants‘ access to long-term Medicaid,12 obligate certain hospitals to 
render emergency medical services without regard for the patient‘s ability 
to pay,
13
 and require hospitals to secure appropriate follow-up care for 
patients in accordance with federal discharge regulations.
14
 While 
hospitals may recoup some costs through Emergency Medicaid—which 
covers the treatment of emergency medical conditions without regard for 
immigration status
15—the scope of Emergency Medicaid, as demonstrated 
in Jimenez‘s case, may not fully compensate hospitals for the treatment of 
uninsured, indigent patients.
16
 Consequently, medical repatriations provide 
an alternative method of cost reduction.
17
  
Even if they provide a creative solution, medical repatriations—which 
have been criticized as international patient dumping and as de facto 
deportations
18—implicate significant concerns for both hospitals and 
 
 
by American hospitals within the last five years and describing repatriations as a ―little-known but 
apparently widespread practice‖). 
 10. Id. For example, newly arrived and undocumented immigrants are ineligible for long-term 
care under Medicaid. Id. However, as a condition of Medicaid and Medicare participation, upon which 
many hospitals depend for funding, hospitals are obligated by federal regulations to establish an 
adequate discharge plan, including post-hospital care, for patients who require such services. Id.; see 
also 42 C.F.R. § 482.43(d) (2009) (requiring hospitals to transfer patients to ―appropriate facilities . . . 
as needed, for follow-up or ancillary care‖). Thus, when hospitals cannot find nursing homes willing to 
accept uninsured patients who require ongoing care, the hospital may be forced to absorb the costs of 
continued treatment. Sontag, supra note 1.  
 11. Sontag, supra note 1. 
 12. See infra Part II.B (describing immigrants‘ narrowed access to Medicaid after 1996). 
 13. See Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd 
(2006). Pursuant to EMTALA, hospitals must provide both screening and stabilizing care to ―any 
individual (whether or not eligible for benefits under this subchapter)‖ who presents at the hospital‘s 
emergency room with an ―emergency medical condition.‖ Id. § 1395dd(a), (b)(1). 
 14. 42 C.F.R. § 482.43(d).  
 15. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(2)(A) (2006).  
 16. Sontag, supra note 1 (commenting that hospitals ―say that emergency Medicaid covers only a 
small fraction‖ of the expenses incurred through the screening and stabilization of immigrant patients 
who are ineligible for long-term Medicaid). 
 17. Id. 
 18. See Judith Graham & Deanese Williams-Harris, Fighting to Keep Comatose Man in U.S., 
CHI. TRIB., Aug. 20, 2008, Zone NW, at 1 (quoting an attorney representing an immigrant involved in 
a medical repatriation dispute, who stated that ―[i]t‘s important to make sure that hospitals aren‘t 
permitted to dump patients on an international level when they can‘t do it on a local level‖); Sontag, 
supra note 1 (remarking that immigrants‘ advocates view repatriations ―as a kind of international 
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immigrants alike. Foremost, although Martin Memorial sought a court 
order before initiating Jimenez‘s removal to Guatemala, the majority of 
medical repatriations are undertaken without legislative authorization or 
judicial oversight.
19
 In the medical context, the permissibility of 
international medical repatriations remains tenuous: in November 2009, 
the American Medical Association‘s (AMA) Council on Ethical and 
Judicial Affairs (CEJA) issued a report, advising against involuntary 
repatriations.
20
 Thus, because the legality of forcibly transporting 
immigrant patients to medical facilities outside the United States remains 
uncertain, hospitals may incur liability through medical repatriations.
21
  
Because repatriations implicate potentially serious consequences for 
both immigrant patients and hospitals, this Note places medical 
repatriations under the microscope by examining the legal causes of action 
arising from forcible repatriations. Part II discusses the history of 
immigrant access to Medicaid and immigrant eligibility for emergency 
Medicaid.
22
 In addition, this Part considers the circumstances in which 
 
 
patient dumping, with ambulances taking patients in the wrong direction, away from first-world 
hospitals to less-adequate care, if any‖).  
 19. Sontag, supra note 1 (describing the Florida District Court of Appeals‘ decision in Montejo 
as ―a case of first impression on the issue of hospital repatriations‖); see also Tim Vanderpool, 
Extraordinary Deportations: Hospitals Ship Immigrants to Their Home Countries—and Often to an 
Uncertain Future, TUCSON WEEKLY, Aug. 14, 2008, available at http://www.tucsonweekly.com/ 
gbase/Currents/Content?oid=oid%3A114107 (stating that medical repatriations ―are occurring in a 
legal twilight, with little or no governmental oversight‖). In Jimenez‘s case, Martin Memorial sought a 
court order after Jimenez‘s guardian refused to consent to the hospital‘s proposed repatriation plan. See 
Sontag, supra note 1. 
 20. DUDLEY M. STEWART, JR., AMER. MED. ASS‘N, CEJA REPORT 2-I-09, PHYSICIAN 
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SAFE PATIENT DISCHARGE 5 (2009) [hereinafter CEJA REPORT], available at 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/interim-2009/i-09-council-reports.pdf. For a discussion 
of the AMA‘s position on repatriation, see Part III.A.2. Comprised of ―seven practicing physicians, a 
resident or fellow, and a medical student,‖ the CEJA ―develops ethics policy for the AMA‖ by 
preparing ―reports that analyze and address timely ethical issues that confront physicians and the 
medical profession.‖ American Medical Association, Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/about-ama/our-people/ama-councils/council-ethical-judicial-affairs. 
shtml (last visited May 13, 2010). 
 21. See, e.g., Sontag, supra note 1. In light of the Florida District Court of Appeals‘ holding in 
Jimenez‘s case, ―John DeLeon, a lawyer who advises the consulates of Mexico, Honduras and 
Guatemala in Miami, said he now referred to [the Montejo case] when he received calls from hospitals 
looking to discharge seriously injured or ill immigrants.‖ Id. When advising hospitals, DeLeon 
cautions hospitals not ―to dump this individual because [you‘ll] be risking legal action.‖ Id. 
 22. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(2)(A) (2006), immigrants who, but for their immigration 
status, are otherwise qualified for Medicaid are eligible for medical care that is ―necessary for the 
treatment of an emergency medical condition of the alien.‖ However, as explained in a House 
Conference Report, ―[t]he allowance for emergency medical services under Medicaid is very narrow‖ 
and applies only to medical care ―that is strictly of an emergency nature, such as medical treatment 
administered in an emergency room, critical care unit, or intensive care unit.‖ H.R. REP. NO. 104-725, 
at 380 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649, 2768.  
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hospitals must provide treatment to uninsured, indigent immigrants, and 
the financial burdens arising from this care. In view of this backdrop, Part 
III evaluates the scope and consequences arising from medical 
repatriations. With reference to the benchmark case of Montejo v. Martin 
Memorial Medical Center,
23
 Part IV considers the potential legal 
consequences of repatriation, including the violation of federal patient 
discharge requirements
24
 and tort liability for false imprisonment.
25
 
Furthermore, because the federal government exercises plenary authority 
over immigration,
26
 this Part evaluates whether immigrants may challenge 
repatriations by public or private hospitals under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. While a comprehensive solution to the 
thorny issue of repatriation exceeds the scope of the Note, hospitals 
should, as a starting point, seek meaningful consent from patients or their 
guardians before repatriation. Doing so will shield the hospital from 
liability, while apprising immigrant patients of the collateral effects of 
repatriation.  
II. HOSPITALS‘ OBLIGATIONS TO TREAT UNINSURED IMMIGRANTS 
Immigrants in the United States, for several reasons, often possess 
limited access to private or public health insurance.
27
 Indeed, of the 
estimated 37.9 million noncitizen immigrants within the United States in 
2006, over 12.8 million (33.8%) lacked any health insurance.
28
 In the 
 
 
 23. 935 So. 2d 1266, 1268–71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that Martin Memorial was not 
entitled to absolute or qualified immunity from the guardian‘s false imprisonment claim for 
repatriating Jimenez in reliance upon a court order that was issued without subject matter jurisdiction); 
874 So. 2d 654, 658 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the trial court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to authorize the repatriation of Jimenez to Guatemala).  
 24. See Montejo, 874 So. 2d at 658 (finding no ―competent substantial evidence‖ to support the 
―transportation (deportation) of Jimenez to Guatemala‖). When advising hospitals, attorney DeLeon 
counsels that ―hospitals can‘t dump immigrant patients without securing appropriate after-care‖ and 
that ―[i]f somebody has a serious illness and needs continuing care, a hospital can‘t simply discharge 
them onto the street, much less put them on a plane.‖ Sontag, supra note 1.  
 25. See Montejo, 935 So. 2d at 1268 (permitting Jimenez‘s guardian to advance a false 
imprisonment claim against Martin Memorial for the hospital‘s forcible confinement of Jimenez in an 
ambulance and airplane).  
 26. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 27. LEIGHTON KU & SHANNON BLANEY, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, HEALTH 
COVERAGE FOR LEGAL IMMIGRANT CHILDREN: NEW CENSUS DATA HIGHLIGHT IMPORTANCE OF 
RESTORING MEDICAID AND SCHIP COVERAGE 11 (2000), http://www.cbpp.org/10-4-00health.pdf 
(noting that ―the proportion of low-income immigrant parents with employer-based coverage is 
considerably lower than the proportion of low-income native-born parents with such coverage‖).  
 28. CEJA REPORT, supra note 20, at 4. These figures include both lawful and undocumented 
immigrants. See STEVEN A. CAMAROTA, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, IMMIGRANTS IN THE 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss6/5
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private insurance sector, many immigrants are employed in industries, 
such as agriculture and food services, that customarily do not provide 
employer-based health insurance to workers.
29
 In the public sector, 
Congress—through the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)
30—constrained immigrants‘ access to 
most forms of Medicaid, a program that is jointly funded by federal and 
state contributions and that provides health care to persons with 
insufficient resources to independently obtain insurance.
31
 Beyond 
constraining health care options for immigrants, narrowed Medicaid 
access imposes burdens upon the hospitals charged with their care: where 
immigrants cannot independently pay for health services and do not 
qualify for nonemergency Medicaid, hospitals may shoulder the financial 
burden associated with their treatment.
32
  
A. Immigrants’ Access to Medicaid Before PRWORA  
Before 1996, immigrants who were lawful permanent residents (LPR) 
and immigrants who were ―otherwise permanently residing in the United 
States under color of law‖ (PRUCOL) were eligible for Medicaid on the 
same basis as U.S. citizens.
33
 Although Congress did not initially define 
PRUCOL‘s boundaries, PRUCOL status often was construed broadly, thus 
affording immigrants with ambiguous immigration statuses an avenue to 
benefits eligibility.
34
 In section 9406 of the Omnibus Budget 
 
 
UNITED STATES, 2007: A PROFILE OF AMERICA‘S FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.cis.org/articles/2007/back1007.pdf. 
 29. Janet M. Calvo, The Consequences of Restricted Health Care Access for Immigrants: 
Lessons from Medicaid and SCHIP, 17 ANNALS HEALTH L. 175, 177–79 (2008). 
 30. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1601–46 (2006). 
 31. Calvo, supra note 29, at 178–79. 
 32. Id. at 183 (noting that, under EMTALA, hospitals must provide screening and stabilizing 
services to all individuals who present with emergency medical conditions, ―causing hospitals to 
increasingly struggle with the costs of uncompensated care‖). 
 33. Id. at 179. As originally enacted in 1965, the Medicaid Act, Title XIX of the Social Security 
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et seq., did not expressly address immigrants‘ eligibility for Medicaid benefits. 
See Coye v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 973 F.2d 786, 787 (9th Cir. 1992). However, in 
1973, the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services issued a regulation 
that required state Medicaid agencies to provide Medicaid to immigrants with LPR and PRUCOL 
status and that precluded federal Medicaid expenditures for the care of undocumented immigrants. Id.; 
see also 42 C.F.R. § 435.402(b) (1979).  
 34. Julia Field Costich, Legislating a Public Health Nightmare: The Anti-immigrant Provisions 
of the “Contract With America” Congress, 90 KY. L.J. 1043, 1046 (2001–02). Through PRUCOL 
status, ―an immigrant whose status was ambiguous, under consideration, or even clearly irregular, 
could be eligible for government-sponsored benefits.‖ Id. However, immigrants could not be under 
active pursuit for deportation by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Id. Moreover, ―the 
majority of undocumented immigrants could not benefit from the PRUCOL doctrine because their lack 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Reconciliation Act of 1986,
35
 Congress affirmed this expansive 
interpretation, stating that PRUCOL should encompass ―all of the 
categories recognized by immigration law, policy, and practice.‖36  
Although undocumented immigrants with indisputably irregular legal 
statuses were ineligible for public benefits via PRUCOL,
37
 in the years 
before PRWORA, ―publicly-funded health care providers and practitioners 
customarily provided necessary health services regardless of immigration 
status.‖38 Some legal scholars suggest that this extension of medical 
services to undocumented immigrants was partially influenced by the 
Supreme Court‘s holding in Plyler v. Doe.39 In Plyler, the Court applied 
intermediate scrutiny to hold that a Texas state law, which barred the 
children of undocumented immigrants from freely enrolling in the state‘s 
public elementary and high schools, violated the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment because the law advanced no substantial 
state interest.
40
 While the majority emphasized the unfairness of penalizing 
the ―innocent children‖ of undocumented immigrants,41 ―an important part 
of the Court‘s opinion turned on federalism concerns and limits on states‘ 
ability to regulate immigration matters, which is [sic] reserved for the 
federal government.‖42 Thus, while finding ―no national policy that 
supports the State in denying these children an elementary education,‖ the 
 
 
of legal status was clear.‖ Id. The judiciary likewise endorsed a broad interpretation of PRUCOL 
status. See, e.g., Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1574–75 (2d Cir. 1985) (―Based on our 
examination of the language of the provision and our review of its legislative history, we find that the 
phrase, ‗under color of law,‘ is designed to be an open vessel—to be given substance by experience.‖). 
 35. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9406(a), 100 Stat. 2057–
58 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(3) (2006)). 
 36. H.R. REP. NO. 99-727, at 111 (1986); see also Calvo, supra note 29, at 180. 
 37. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. But see Lewis v. Gross, 663 F. Supp. 1164 
(E.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that 42 C.F.R. § 435.402 violated the Medicaid statute, which did not 
include an express alienage requirement). In 1986, Congress amended the Medicaid statute through 
§ 9406(c) of the Omnibus Budget Reconcilliation Act (OBRA) to exclude aliens without LPR or 
PRUCOL status from accessing the full scope of Medicaid. Jane Perkins, Medicaid Coverage of 
Emergency Medical Conditions: An Update, NAT‘L HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, May 7, 2007, at 2 & 
n.10, http://www.healthlaw.org/images/stories/issues/ medicaidcoverage-emergencymedical.pdf.  
 38. Costich, supra note 34, at 1047. 
 39. 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Brietta R. Clark, The Immigrant Health Care Narrative and What It 
Tells Us About the U.S. Health Care System, 17 ANNALS HEALTH L. 229, 238 (2008) (describing 
Plyler‘s effect as a ―controversial limit on state autonomy‖); see also Costich, supra note 34, at 1047 
(stating that, in Plyler, ―the Supreme Court required state and local governments to extend basic public 
benefits to residents regardless of immigration status. Until 1996, such benefits were presumed to 
include health care.‖). 
 40. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.  
 41. Id.  
 42. See Clark, supra note 39, at 238; see also Plyler, 457 U.S. at 225 (stating that the states 
possess ―no power with respect to the classification of aliens‖ because ―this power is ‗committed to the 
political branches of the Federal Government‘‖ (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976))).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss6/5
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Court noted that ―[s]tates do have some authority to act with respect to 
illegal aliens, at least where such action mirrors federal objectives and 
furthers a legitimate state goal.‖43  
B. Immigrants’ Limited Medicaid Eligibility After PRWORA 
In 1996, Congress articulated such a federal policy by enacting 
PRWORA,
44
 which broadened state authority to condition access to state 
and local public benefits on immigration status and thereby authorized 
―the kind of state restriction on benefits that were previously vulnerable to 
constitutional attack.‖45 Among its objectives, Congress sought to reduce 
the federal government‘s social service expenditures.46 To help effectuate 
this purpose, PRWORA overhauled the method by which immigrant 
eligibility for public benefits was assessed and curtailed Medicaid for 
documented and undocumented immigrants.
47
 
Under PRWORA, public-benefits eligibility is limited to a narrowly 
defined subset of ―qualified‖ immigrants.48 All other immigrants—
including undocumented immigrants and immigrants who were previously 
eligible through PRUCOL status—are deemed nonqualified, and thus 
ineligible for most forms of Medicaid.
49
 A limited exception to PRWORA 
 
 
 43. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 225; id. at 226. Additionally, the Court observed that ―the courts must be 
attentive to congressional policy; the exercise of congressional power might well affect the State‘s 
prerogatives to afford differential treatment to a particular class of aliens.‖ Id. at 224.  
 44. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1601–46 (2006).  
 45. Clark, supra note 39, at 239 (commenting that PRWORA ―was widely understood as 
Congress‘ attempt to answer Plyler‘s federalism concerns‖). 
 46. Costich, supra note 34, at 1048 n.25. Indeed, ―the Congressional Budget Office estimated 
that the immigrant restrictions would generate roughly 40 percent of welfare reform‘s overall savings 
of $54 billion—despite the fact that in 1996 immigrants represented only 15 percent of all welfare 
recipients in the United States.‖ MICHAEL FIX & JEFFREY PASSEL, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, THE SCOPE 
AND IMPACT OF WELFARE REFORM‘S IMMIGRANT PROVISIONS 5 (2002), available at http://www. 
urban.org/Uploadedpdf/410412_discussion02-03.pdf [hereinafter WELFARE REFORM‘S IMMIGRANT 
PROVISIONS]. 
 47. See 8 U.S.C. § 1611(a) (2006) (stating that, with the exception of emergency medical 
conditions, an ―alien who is not a qualified alien . . . is not eligible for any Federal public benefit‖); 
Perkins, supra note 37, at 3 (stating that PRWORA ―denies full scope Medicaid benefits to most 
immigrants‖). 
 48. See Clark, supra note 39, at 235 (noting that ―PRWORA created a broad rule against access 
to certain federally-funded public benefits for legal permanent and temporary residents, with 
exceptions created for certain narrowly defined groups‖). Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b)(1)-(7) 
(2006), qualified aliens for purposes of Medicaid eligibility are defined exhaustively as LPRs; refugees 
and asylees; certain Cuban, Haitian, and Amerasian immigrants; aliens paroled in the United States for 
a period of at least one year; aliens granted withholding of deportation by the INS; aliens granted 
conditional entry into the United States; and aliens subjected to domestic violence who are in the 
process of obtaining a status as qualified aliens.  
 49. Tanya Broder, Overview of Immigrant Eligibility for Federal Programs, LOW-INCOME 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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permits nonqualified immigrants to remain eligible for certain healthcare 
benefits, including the treatment of emergency medical conditions,
50
 
public health immunizations,
51
 and the testing and treatment of symptoms 
of communicable diseases.
52
 But, states may not use federal Medicaid 
funds for immunizations or for the testing and treatment of communicable 
diseases.
53
  
Moreover, even qualified immigrants confront diminished access to 
public benefits under PRWORA—which imposes additional eligibility 
requirements
54—and under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).
55
 For example, with limited 
exceptions,
56
 PRWORA differentiates qualified immigrants on the basis of 
their date of immigration.
57
 Otherwise qualified recent immigrants, 
defined as those who entered the United States on or after the date of the 
PRWORA‘s enactment in 1996, cannot access ―[f]ederal means-tested 
public benefit[s],‖ including Medicaid, for the first five years of their 
 
 
IMMIGRANT RTS. CONF. (Nat‘l Immigration Law Ctr., Los Angeles, Cal.), Dec. 2007, at 4.2, available 
at http://www.lb9.uscourts.gov/webcites/09documents/Mendoza_overview.pdf.  
 50. 8 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1)(A). 
 51. Id. § 1611(b)(1)(C). 
 52. Id.  
 53. NAT‘L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, THE IMMIGRANT POLICY PROJECT: MEDICAL 
ASSISTANCE & HEALTH BENEFITS (1997), http://ecom.ncsl.org/programs/immig/MedIB.htm (―States 
may not use Medicaid funds for public health immunizations or for testing and treatment of symptoms 
of communicable diseases . . . for ‗not qualified‘ aliens.‖). 
 54. Perkins, supra note 37, at 3. 
 55. To prevent immigrants from becoming public charges, ―PRWORA and IIRIRA substantially 
changed the rules regarding affidavits of support and sponsor deeming of income,‖ thereby 
―impos[ing] greater legal liability on sponsors and [making] it more difficult for new immigrants to 
qualify for public benefits even after they have lived in the United States for five years.‖ CLAUDIA 
SCHLOSBERG, NAT‘L HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, IMMIGRANT ACCESS TO HEALTH BENEFITS: A 
RESOURCE MANUAL 35 (1999–2000), available at http://www.accessproject.org/downloads/ 
Immigrant_Access.pdf. As defined by PRWORA and IIRIRA, an affidavit of support ―is a legally 
enforceable agreement between the sponsor and the government whereby the sponsor agrees to 
provide sufficient support to maintain an immigrant at 125 percent of the [federal poverty line].‖ Id. 
For a description of affidavit of support requirements, see 8 U.S.C. § 1183a (2006).  
 56. These exceptions include the following: asylees, refugees, and ―active-duty members or 
veterans of the U.S. Armed Forces.‖ See KAISER COMM‘N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, 
MEDICAID AND SCHIP ELIGIBILITY FOR IMMIGRANTS, 1 (2006), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/ 
7492.pdf [hereinafter KAISER COMM‘N REPORT]. 
 57. See 8 U.S.C. § 1613(a) (2006) (imposing a five-year bar on Medicaid eligibility for those 
qualified aliens who enter the United States ―on or after August 22, 1996‖); see also Perkins, supra 
note 37, at 3 (describing the manner in which qualified aliens are classified into two groups on the 
basis of their date of entry into the United States). However, refugees, asylees, persons granted 
withholding of deportation or removal, victims of trafficking, and Cuban, Haitian, and Amerasian 
immigrants are exempt from the five-year eligibility bar. BRODER, supra note 49, at 4.4. Veterans and 
active duty military personnel, as well as their spouses and children, are similarly exempt. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss6/5
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residency.
58
 Even beyond PRWORA‘s five-year limitations, immigrants 
who are required under IIRIRA to obtain an Affidavit of Support by a U.S. 
citizen or LPR sponsor when applying for permanent residence may 
confront Medicaid benefits restrictions lasting ten years.
59
 In the Affidavit, 
the sponsor provides a legally binding guarantee that the immigrant ―will 
not become a public charge for ten years following admission to the 
U.S.‖60 In addition, states may further restrict access to Medicaid beyond 
the five-year bar by limiting eligibility to immigrants who have worked 
continuously for forty quarters or who have become naturalized citizens.
61
 
By permitting states to restrict or expand public-benefits eligibility for 
immigrants beyond even federal limitations, PRWORA nominally 
purported to broaden state authority in the immigration arena.
62
 However, 
by narrowing the availability of federal funding for immigrants‘ Medicaid 
eligibility, PRWORA, in practical effect, has resulted in a substantial cost 
shifting from the federal to the state level and thus has weighed heavily 
against any state or local expansion of benefits for immigrants.
63
 As a 
 
 
 58. 8 U.S.C. § 1613(a). Federal means-tested public benefits include Medicaid (with the 
exception of emergency care), SCHIP, TANF, Food Stamps, and Supplemental Security Income. 
BRODER, supra note 49, at 4.4. The five-year bar to public-benefits eligibility advanced several 
Congressional objectives: (1) to ―alter immigration flows by discouraging immigrants likely to seek 
public benefits from entering the United States,‖ (2) to ―shift responsibility for the support of 
immigrants away from the government and onto newcomers‘ sponsors,‖ and (3) to ―realize . . . cost 
savings.‖ See WELFARE REFORM‘S IMMIGRANT PROVISIONS, supra note 46, at 5. 
 59. See 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2 (2009). For example, family-based immigrants must provide an 
Affidavit of Support. Id. § 213a.2(a)(2)(i)(B). The sponsor‘s support obligations last until the 
immigrant becomes a U.S. citizen or has worked ―40 qualifying quarters‖ without having received 
―any Federal means-tested public benefit.‖ § 213a.2(e)(2)(i)(B). 
 60. Joseph Wolpin, Medical Repatriation of Alien Patients, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 152, 154 
(2009). The Affidavit ―creates a contract between the sponsor and the U.S. Government for the benefit 
of the sponsored immigrant, and of any Federal, State, or local governmental agency or private entity 
that administers any means-tested public benefits program.‖ 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(d). Consequently, ―any 
Federal, State, or local governmental agency or private entity that provides any means-tested public 
benefit to the sponsored immigrant after the sponsored immigrant acquires permanent resident status, 
may seek enforcement of the sponsor‘s obligations through an appropriate civil action.‖ Id. 
 61. See 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(1); KAISER COMM‘N REPORT, supra note 56, at 2. As with the five-
year bar, humanitarian immigrants, including refugees and asylees, may not be further barred through 
more restrictive state measures. KAISER COMM‘N REPORT, supra note 56, at 2. 
 62. Clark, supra note 39, at 239. The so-called expansion of state discretion under PRWORA 
permits states to enact more restrictive measures than the federal default position but has made it more 
difficult for states to broaden immigrants‘ access to public benefits. Id.; see also Candice Hoke, State 
Discretion Under New Federal Welfare Legislation: Illusion, Reality and a Federalism-Based 
Constitutional Challenge, 9 STAN. L. & POL‘Y REV. 115, 118 (1998). Characterizing the latitude 
granted to states as ―uni-directional flexibility,‖ Hoke contends that ―where the Act awards states 
greater flexibility, it typically permits them to move only in a direction consistent with embedded, 
hard-nosed federal norms.‖ Id.  
 63. See Costich, supra note 34, at 1057 (―Where states have elected to fund these benefits 
themselves, costs have been transferred from the federal government to the states.‖). In addition, state 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1438 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:1429 
 
 
 
 
further disincentive, it also erected procedural barriers to providing 
Medicaid to non-qualified immigrants.
64
 Thus, nonqualified immigrants 
may become eligible for non-emergency health care benefits only through 
the enactment of a state law expressly authorizing such access.
65
  
Despite the procedural constraints imposed by PRWORA, twenty-two 
states and the District of Columbia have extended varying degrees of 
Medicaid coverage to some nonqualified immigrants.
66
 Yet, other state and 
local governments, particularly those with large populations of 
undocumented immigrants, have mirrored federal trends by restricting 
immigrant health care benefits.
67
 In Texas, the state Attorney General 
stated that Houston-area, public-health agencies were ―not authorized by 
state or federal law to provide outpatient services to allegedly ineligible 
immigrants.‖68 Therefore, where states elect not to expand Medicaid 
access to non-qualified immigrants, the costs of providing care have 
further devolved to local safety nets: financially strained hospitals and 
health care clinics.
69
 
 
 
legislation purporting to broaden immigrants‘ eligibility for Medicaid ―could be very difficult and 
politically unpopular in light of the surge in anti-immigrant sentiment.‖ Clark, supra note 39, at 240.  
 64. Clark, supra note 39, at 239. 
 65. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d), ―[a] state may provide that an alien who is not lawfully 
present in the United States is eligible for any State or local public benefit . . . only through the 
enactment of a State law.‖ Such procedural requirements ―create political hurdles that make it difficult 
for state governments to provide these benefits.‖ Hoke, supra note 62, at 119. 
 66. KAISER COMM‘N REPORT, supra note 56. For example, fourteen states have extended 
Medicaid coverage to legal immigrant children deemed otherwise ineligible. Likewise, Washington 
offers ―full Medicaid benefits to low-income, post-PRWORA immigrants‖ who have resided ―in the 
state for more than one year,‖ and ―California provides coverage to all legal immigrants‖ via Medi-
Cal. Costich, supra note 34, at 1056. In 2007, Medi-Cal spent approximately $20 million on the care 
of 460 uninsured immigrants last year. Deborah Sontag, Deported in Coma, Saved Back in U.S., N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/09/us/09deport.html. 
Massachusetts accords ―full Medicaid benefits to persons who were receiving long-term care at the 
time of enactment and a reduced benefit package to PRUCOL and post-PRWORA immigrants.‖ 
Costich, supra note 34, at 1056. 
 67. Clark, supra note 39, at 233. 
 68. Costich, supra note 34, at 1056; see also Op. Tex. Att‘y Gen. No. JC-0394 (July 10, 2001), 
available at http://www.org.state.tx.us/opinions/opinions/49cornyn/op/2001/htm/jc0394.htm.  
 69. Costich, supra note 34, at 1057 (noting that ―[e]ligibility restrictions under the PRWORA 
have had the intended effect of shifting costs away from the federal government, generally bringing 
the financial burden closer to the place where care is delivered‖ and that ―[w]here state-funded benefits 
for ineligible immigrants are not available, costs have shifted to the municipal funders of safety net 
providers such as public hospitals and clinics‖).  
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C. Health Care Services Available to Non-Qualified Immigrants 
Despite the narrowing effects of PRWORA,
70
 nonqualified immigrants 
are entitled to limited health care benefits and services.
71
 First, under 
EMTALA,
72
 virtually all hospitals with emergency rooms are required to 
screen and stabilize emergency medical conditions without regard for the 
patient‘s Medicaid eligibility, immigration status, or independent ability to 
pay.
73
 Second, nonqualified immigrants who, but for their immigration 
status, would otherwise qualify for Medicaid are eligible to receive 
coverage under Emergency Medicaid for the treatment of emergency 
medical conditions.
74
  
1. EMTALA 
Introduced in 1986, EMTALA was enacted to address the ―critical 
problem of hospital emergency department dumping of the medically 
uninsured,‖ a practice by which hospitals refuse to treat or inappropriately 
transfer patients who are unable to pay for medical care.
75
 Codifying the 
belief that all individuals are entitled to receive emergency medical care 
regardless of immigration status or financial means,
76
 EMTALA requires 
 
 
 70. See generally Calvo, supra note 29, at 179–182 (discussing the effects of PRWORA on 
immigrants‘ access to Medicaid benefits). 
 71. See, e.g., Perkins, supra note 37, at 3.  
 72. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006).  
 73. EMTALA, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd, applies to ―any individual (whether or not 
eligible for benefits under this subchapter).‖ Id. § 1395dd(a); see also Svetlana Lebedinski, Note, 
EMTALA: Treatment of Undocumented Aliens and the Financial Burden It Places on Hospitals, 7 J.L. 
SOC‘Y 146, 147 (2005) (noting that ―EMTALA creates a duty to provide care to all individuals, 
regardless of the availability of health insurance coverage or eligibility for federally sponsored 
programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid‖). Because hospitals typically must accept federal and state-
sponsored health insurance in order to maintain financial solvency, EMTALA‘s obligations, in 
practical effect, apply to all hospitals with an emergency room. Morgan Greenspon, The Emergency 
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act and Sources of Funding, 17 ANNALS HEALTH L. 309, 311–
12 (2008). 
 74. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(2)(A) (2006); see also id. § 1396b(v)(3)(A)–(C) (defining the term, 
emergency medical condition). ―However, if the patient does not qualify for Emergency Medicaid, 
then a hospital may go completely uncompensated.‖ Greenspon, supra note 73, at 313. 
 75. 131 CONG. REC. S13,904 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1985) (statement of Sen. Heinz). Senator Heinz 
remarked that Cook County Hospital in Chicago, a public facility, ―receives over 500 patients per 
month transferred directly from other emergency departments‖ because such patients lack health 
insurance to pay for private medical care. Id. at S13,905; see also Marshall v. E. Carroll Parish Hosp. 
Serv. Dist., 134 F.3d 319, 322 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing cases identifying the prevention of patient 
dumping as the purpose of EMTALA); Calvo, supra note 29, at 182 (―Congress passed the Emergency 
Medical Treatment Act . . . to guarantee emergency health care to every individual and to prevent 
patient dumping by hospitals and providers.‖). 
 76. See, e.g., 131 CONG. REC. 228,568 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1985) (statement of Sen. Durenberger) 
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all participating hospitals to provide an ―appropriate medical screening 
examination‖ to any individual seeking treatment for an ―emergency 
medical condition.‖77 For purposes of EMTALA, a participating hospital 
is one with both an emergency department and a federal Medicare 
contract.
78
 Yet, EMTALA provides no mechanism to compensate hospitals 
for the costs associated with the screening and stabilization of emergency 
medical conditions.
79
 
Adopting the definition set forth in the Emergency Medicaid statute, 
EMTALA defines an emergency medical condition as one ―manifesting 
itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) 
such that the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be 
expected to result in‖ any of the following adverse consequences: ―placing 
the patient‘s health in serious jeopardy, serious impairment to bodily 
functions, or serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part.‖80 Where an 
individual manifests these acute symptoms, the hospital cannot transfer or 
discharge the individual before screening the patient and providing 
stabilizing treatment adequate to reasonably ensure ―that no material 
deterioration of the condition is likely to result from or occur during the 
transfer.‖81 Moreover, all patient transfers must be ―appropriate,‖ meaning 
that they are effectuated by qualified personnel and transportation 
equipment; that the receiving hospital has available space and qualified 
medical staff; that the hospital has agreed to accept the transfer and can 
provide treatment to minimize medical risks; and that the patient‘s medical 
records are provided to the receiving hospital.
82
  
 
 
(―The purpose of this amendment is to send a clear signal to the hospital community, public and 
private alike, that all Americans, regardless of wealth or status, should know that a hospital will 
provide what services it can when they are truly in physical distress.‖). 
 77. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a).  
 78. Calvo, supra note 29, at 182; see also 42 C.F.R. § 489.24 (stating the ―[s]pecial 
responsibilities of Medicare hospitals in emergency cases‖). 
 79. See Sean Elliott, Staying Within the Lines: The Question of Post-stabilization Treatment for 
Illegal Immigrants Under Emergency Medicaid, 24 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL‘Y 149, 173 (2007) 
(noting that EMTALA does not provide for federal reimbursement of the services it requires and, 
accordingly, may obligate hospitals ―to treat patients from whom they can expect to receive no 
payment whatsoever, either from the patient or the federal government‖). 
 80. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(3)(A)–(C) (2006); see also Elliott, supra note 79, at 151–52 (noting 
that although the definition of emergency medical condition appears to set forth a bright-line standard, 
its scope has, in practice, proven ambiguous). 
 81. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1)(A), (e)(3)(A). A hospital may transfer a patient who has not been 
stabilized only if the patient requests a transfer in writing or if a physician or qualified medical 
personnel certifies that the expected benefits of treatment at another facility outweigh the risks of 
transfer. See id. § 1395dd(c)(1)(A)(i)–(iii).  
 82. Id. § 1395dd(c)(2)(A)–(D).  
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EMTALA violations implicate potentially serious penalties. The Office 
of the Inspector General (OIG) may levee up to $50,000 in civil penalties 
per violation upon hospitals that negligently breach EMTALA‘s 
requirements.
83
 In addition, the statute accords individuals who suffer 
personal harm arising from the hospital‘s EMTALA violation a civil cause 
of action to obtain damages or equitable relief against the hospital.
84
 
Finally, albeit an infrequent consequence, the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) may bar noncompliant hospitals from Medicare 
participation.
85
 
Because EMTALA does not reimburse hospitals for the treatment it 
requires,
86
 the statute is widely regarded as a financial burden to hospitals, 
particularly among those serving a large population of indigent, uninsured 
patients.
87
 The hospital may seek compensation from the patient; however, 
physicians may not delay screening or treatment to inquire about an 
individual‘s ―method of payment or insurance status.‖88 Consequently, if a 
patient is not eligible for Emergency Medicaid or if funding through 
Emergency Medicaid does not fully reimburse the hospital for services 
rendered under EMTALA, hospitals may go uncompensated.
89
  
In recognition of the burdens imposed on hospitals by virtue of 
EMTALA‘s obligation to treat undocumented, indigent immigrants, 
Congress enacted section 1011 of the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003,
90
 ―[i]n an effort to assist 
hospitals and other providers with their uncompensated care costs.‖91 
Appropriating $250 million per fiscal years 2005 through 2008 to 
compensate hospitals for emergency medical care provided to 
undocumented, indigent patients, section 1011 offered coverage from the 
 
 
 83. Id. § 1395dd(d)(1). 
 84. Id. § 1395dd(d)(2). Although EMTALA creates a private cause of action against the hospital, 
the statute does not entitle the patient to initiate a lawsuit against the treating physician. Id. 
 85. Id. § 1395dd(d)(1). 
 86. Laura D. Hermer, The Scapegoat: EMTALA and Emergency Department Overcrowding, 14 
J.L. & POL‘Y 695, 702 (2006) (characterizing EMTALA as an ―unfunded mandate‖). 
 87. Lebedinski, supra note 73, at 154–55 (noting that EMTALA imposes a ―great financial 
burden‖ on hospitals and ―disproportionately‖ burdens ―inner-city, rural and public hospitals‖). In 
addition, ―EMTALA creates a financial anomaly in which hospitals can only seek federal 
reimbursement for medical emergencies, and not reimbursement for less expensive preventative care.‖ 
Greenspon, supra note 73, at 312. 
 88. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(h). 
 89. Greenspon, supra note 73, at 314.  
 90. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-
173, Title X, § 1011, 117 Stat. 2432 (2003) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).  
 91. Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Emergency Health Servs. for 
Undocumented Aliens: Section 1011 of the Medicare Modernization Act (May 9, 2005), http://www. 
cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press/release.asp?Counter=1452.  
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time a patient presents at the hospital emergency department until the 
point of stabilization.
92
 However, section 1011 expired in October 2008, 
with no immediate plans for renewal.
93
 
2. Emergency Medicaid  
Whereas EMTALA affirmatively obligates hospitals to screen and 
stabilize emergency medical conditions without regard for immigration 
status or ability to pay, Emergency Medicaid is the instrument through 
which hospitals may seek compensation for the emergency services 
tendered to nonqualified immigrants.
94
 Emergency Medicaid, codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(3), was enacted within the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1986, in which Congress generally sought to reduce 
government expenditures.
95
 To effectuate this purpose and to clarify 
uncertainties surrounding immigrants‘ eligibility for Medicaid, Congress 
―barred medicaid assistance to aliens not residing in the United States 
under color of law unless the alien suffered from an emergency medical 
condition.‖96 Pursuant to § 1396b(v), Medicaid payments ―shall be made,‖ 
provided that several requirements are met: the care is necessary for the 
treatment of an immigrant‘s emergency medical condition, the immigrant 
―otherwise meets eligibility requirements for medical assistance‖ under the 
state-approved plan, and the care does not relate to an organ transplant 
procedure.
97
  
Although both EMTALA and Emergency Medicaid adopt the same 
definition of an emergency medical condition,
98
 the scope of an emergency 
 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. Although it failed to pass the 110th Congress, the Border Health Care Relief Act of 2008 was 
introduced in the House on June 26, 2008 and proposed to ―amend the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 to extend Federal reimbursement of emergency health 
services furnished to undocumented aliens‖ through fiscal year 2012. H.R. 6394, 110th Cong. (2008).  
 94. See, e.g., Szewczyk v. Dep‘t of Soc. Servs., 881 A.2d 259, 286 (Conn. 2005) (Sullivan, C.J., 
dissenting) (―EMTALA is the only law mandating the treatment of an illegal alien‘s emergency 
medical condition. [Emergency Medicaid] merely authorizes payment to the states for the treatment of 
an emergency medical condition after it has been provided.‖ (emphasis in original)); Greenspon, supra 
note 73, at 313–14.  
 95. See Szewczyk, 881 A.2d at 278 (Sullivan, C.J., dissenting). 
 96. Id. (stating that the Medicaid provision was enacted in 1986 ―in response to a ruling by the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York,‖ wherein the court held that ―federal 
medicaid law placed no restriction on alien eligibility for medicaid assistance‖). For a case history of 
this decision, see Lewis v. Thompson, 252 F.3d 567 (2d Cir. 2001), and for a description of the effect 
of Lewis, see Perkins, supra note 37, at 2. 
 97. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(2)(A)–(C) (2006).  
 98. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. In 1990, the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) ―expressly recognized the relationship‖ between Emergency Medicaid and EMTALA 
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for purposes of immigrants‘ Emergency Medicaid coverage has troubled 
health care providers and courts alike.
99
 As reflected in the explanatory 
language issued by the Department of Health and Human Services in 
1990, the term ―emergency medical condition‖ initially received a ―broad 
definition‖ in order to permit states to ―interpret and further define the 
services available to aliens‖ in a manner ―supported by professional 
medical judgment.‖100 But, in the years after PRWORA, courts have 
diverged in construing the contours of Emergency Medicaid.
101
  
Advancing a broad interpretation, in Mercy Healthcare Arizona, Inc. v. 
Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System,
102
 Arizona‘s intermediate 
appellate court addressed the meaning of an emergency medical condition 
in the context of a catastrophic automobile accident that rendered the 
victim—an undocumented immigrant—comatose, paralyzed, and reliant 
upon a gastrointestinal feeding tube.
103
 The court held that Emergency 
Medicaid encompasses treatment for medical conditions that manifest by 
an acute symptom, ―so long as absence of immediate treatment for that 
condition ‗could reasonably be expected to result in‘‖ one of the adverse 
consequences contemplated in 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v).
104
 Thus, Emergency 
Medicaid coverage does not terminate immediately upon the resolution of 
the acute symptom that prompted the initial need for medical treatment.
105
 
At a federal level, the Second Circuit has narrowly construed the 
boundaries of emergency medical conditions by distinguishing chronic 
and acute symptoms. In Greenery Rehabilitation Group, Inc. v. 
Hammon,
106
 the patients at issue were undocumented immigrants who 
suffered catastrophic head injuries and who, after receiving stabilizing in-
 
 
when it revised the implementing regulation, 42 C.F.R. § 440.255(c)(1), to ―make the definition of 
emergency services consistent with‖ EMTALA‘s interpretation. Szewczyk, 881 A.2d at 279. 
 99. See Elliott, supra 79, at 152 (noting that ―[i]n cases brought by individuals and health care 
providers, the courts have come up with somewhat conflicting interpretations of this term, leaving 
open to question the exact scope of Medicaid coverage for illegal immigrants.‖); Szewczyk, 881 A.2d 
at 286–87 (Sullivan, C.J., dissenting) (declining to construe Emergency Medicaid in the broad manner 
advanced by certain state courts).  
 100. Medicaid Program: Eligibility of Aliens for Medicaid, 55 Fed. Reg. 36, 816 (Sept. 7, 1990) 
(codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 435, 436, 440).  
 101. See generally Calvo, supra note 29, at 184–89.  
 102. 887 P.2d 625 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). 
 103. Id. at 627; see also Gaddam v. Rowe, 684 A.2d 286 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1995) (concluding that 
outpatient dialysis for an undocumented immigrant suffering end-stage renal disease satisfied that 
statutory definition of an emergency medical condition and thus warranted coverage under Emergency 
Medicaid).  
 104. Mercy Healthcare, 887 P.2d at 628–29. 
 105. Id. at 629. 
 106. 150 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 1998).  
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hospital treatment, were transferred to rehabilitation facilities.
107
 Reversing 
the district court,
108
 the Second Circuit concluded that the hospital‘s 
stabilizing treatment resolved the patients‘ respective emergency medical 
conditions.
109
 Following stabilization, the patients suffered chronic 
conditions
110
 that exceeded the statutory scope of Emergency Medicaid, 
even though the condition arose through initially emergent 
circumstances.
111
  
D. Burdens on Hospitals 
The foregoing provisions have posed an economic quandary for 
hospitals by mandating treatment for certain immigrants who do not 
qualify for public benefits and who cannot independently afford medical 
treatment.
112
 While Emergency Medicaid provides one avenue to 
compensate hospitals, its reimbursement potential is limited by several 
factors.
113
 First, only those immigrants who, but for their migration status, 
―otherwise qualify‖ for Medicaid under the state-approved plan are 
entitled to receive Emergency Medicaid.
114
 Accordingly, hospitals cannot 
seek Emergency Medicaid reimbursements for the care of nonqualified 
immigrants who fail to satisfy the income and residency conditions 
required for Medicaid.
115
  
 
 
 107. Id. at 228–29. The first patient, who suffered ―severe brain damage‖ following an automobile 
accident, was quadriplegic and required ―continual monitoring and extensive nursing care.‖ Id. at 228. 
Likewise, following a gunshot wound that resulted in brain damage, the second patient remained 
unable to walk, prone to seizures, and reliant upon assistance for daily tasks ―such as bathing, dressing, 
eating, and toileting.‖ Id. at 229.  
 108. Id. at 233. Crediting the treating physicians‘ testimonies, the district court determined that the 
patients were treated for emergency medical conditions in their respective rehabilitation facilities 
because the absence of this care would seriously imperil the patients‘ health and bodily functions. Id. 
at 230–31. For example, the district court determined that the patient who suffered a gunshot wound 
was receiving emergency medical care, the absence of which would render him ―‗without food, in his 
own waste, [and] unable to move.‘‖ Id. at 231 (quoting Greenway Rehabilitation Group, Inc. v. 
Hammon, 893 F. Supp. 1195, 1206 (N.D.N.Y. 1995)).  
 109. Id. at 233. 
 110. Id. at 232. While the Second Circuit concluded that chronic rehabilitative treatment exceeded 
the statutory definition of an emergency, the court observed that an emergency could arise in the 
course of chronic care. For example, ―if one of these patients suffered a sudden heart attack, treatment 
to stabilize the patient would be covered by Medicaid pursuant to § 1396b(v)(3).‖ Id. at 233. 
 111. Id. at 233. The Second Circuit further observed that several treating physicians described the 
patients‘ conditions as chronic. Id. at 232.  
 112. Greenspon, supra note 73, at 314. 
 113. Id. at 313–14 (citing instances in which Emergency Medicaid fails to compensate hospitals 
for the treatment of undocumented immigrants). 
 114. Id. at 313.  
 115. Perkins, supra note 37, at 4 (explaining that states have ―denied Medicaid coverage for 
emergency medical conditions citing the residency provisions‖). For Medicaid eligibility among 
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Second, because the line between emergent and chronic symptoms is 
ill-defined, hospitals ―must confront whether government officials will 
agree with their assessment of what constitutes appropriate treatment of an 
emergency medical condition‖ in seeking reimbursement through 
emergency Medicaid.
116
 In accordance with EMTALA, a hospital may 
render what it believes to be stabilizing care to a nonqualified, indigent 
immigrant who presents with an emergency medical condition.
117
 Yet, if 
the government or a reviewing court instead defines the condition as 
chronic, the hospital may go uncompensated.
118
 Thus, health care 
providers face a Hobson‘s choice: the hospital can offer treatment for a 
perceived emergency, which may prove financially undesirable if 
reimbursement is denied,
119
 or it can withhold treatment, possibly in 
derogation from EMTALA‘s requirements. 
Third, as a condition of Medicare participation, federal regulations 
mandate the implementation of adequate discharge plans for patients, 
obligating hospitals to ―transfer or refer patients, along with necessary 
medical information, to appropriate facilities, agencies, or outpatient 
services, as needed, for follow-up or ancillary care.‖120 Likewise, the Joint 
 
 
individuals age twenty-one and over, the state of residence is defined as ―the State where the 
individual is . . . [l]iving with the intention to remain there permanently or for an indefinite period.‖ 42 
C.F.R. § 435.403(i)(1)(i) (2006). Thus, if the immigrant has not manifested a sufficient intent to 
remain, Medicaid coverage for emergency medical conditions may be denied. See Perkins, supra note 
37, at 4. For example, in Okale v. North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, 570 
S.E.2d 741, 744 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002), the court affirmed the Medicaid agency‘s denial of coverage for 
Ms. Okale, who possessed an unexpired nonimmigrant tourist visa. Although she had entered a lease, 
procured a driver‘s license, and opened a bank account, the court determined that her ―unexpired 
tourist temporary visa creates the verification to doubt Okale‘s asserted intent to remain in the state. To 
hold otherwise, we must presume that Okale will violate the law and attempt to illegally stay beyond 
her latest declared date of departure from this state and country.‖ Id. at 742, 745; see also Perkins, 
supra note 37, at 4–5 (describing Okale and stating that ―[c]ourts have generally affirmed states‘ 
refusals to cover emergency conditions based on the non-resident status of the noncitizen‖).  
 116. Calvo, supra note 29, at 190. In addition, the disbursement of Emergency Medicaid funds 
may raise disputes between federal and state authorities. Id. While state-level Medicaid programs 
determine reimbursement to hospitals within the state, these state programs, ―particularly those with 
significant immigrant populations, face federal rejection of their determinations, subjecting them to 
loss of federal dollars for reimbursement of Medicaid expenses.‖ Id. For example, ―from 2001 to 2006, 
the federal government denied [New York] state about $11 million in matching funds for the cancer 
treatment‖ provided to uninsured immigrants. See Sarah Kershaw, New York, Faulting U.S., Says It 
Will Pay for Cancer Care for Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at B3.  
 117. Calvo, supra note 29, at 190. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See generally Creativity is the Key in Discharge Planning for Undocumented Immigrants, 14 
HOSP. CASE MGMT. 97, 97–100 (2006) (noting that, in 2000, ―hospitals in just 24 counties along the 
Mexican border spent more than $200 million on emergency health care and transportation for 
undocumented immigrants,‖ according to a Border Counties Coalition study) [hereinafter ―Creativity 
is the Key in Discharge Planning‖].  
 120. 42 C.F.R. § 482.43(d) (2008) (emphasis added); see also Alfred J. Chiplin, Jr., Breathing Life 
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Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (Joint Commission) provides 
that accredited hospitals ―must have in place a mechanism to ensure that 
. . . admission, transfer, and discharge practices are conducted in an ethical 
manner.‖121 Accordingly, inappropriate discharge may constitute patient 
abandonment,
122
 even when appropriate post-acute treatment for non-
qualified, indigent immigrants is difficult, if not impossible, to find.
123
 
Thus, when long-term care facilities refuse uninsured, indigent patients, 
hospitals are left to shoulder the cost.
124
  
III. MEDICAL REPATRIATIONS  
As Part II illustrates, the confluence of federal immigration laws and 
health care laws situate indigent immigrant patients who do not qualify for 
Medicaid as a unique financial threat to hospitals.
125
 On one hand, 
PRWORA restricts access to nonemergency Medicaid for nonqualified 
immigrants and for otherwise qualified immigrants who have not satisfied 
a five-year residency requirement.
126
 On the other hand, irrespective of the 
patient‘s immigration status or ability to pay, hospitals are obligated to 
provide stabilizing treatment through EMTALA and must adhere to 
federal discharge requirements, which require the hospital to secure 
appropriate ancillary care for patients who require post-acute treatment.
127
 
Consequently, from this quagmire, medical repatriations of immigrant 
patients have emerged as a vigilante response to the burden of 
uncompensated care.  
 
 
into Discharge Planning, 13 ELDER L.J. 1, 27 (2005). CMS has described ―appropriate facilities‖ as 
―those with the appropriate capabilities to handle the patient‘s condition.‖ SURVEY & CERTIFICATION 
GROUP, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., PROVISION OF EMERGENCY SERVICES–
IMPORTANT REQUIREMENTS FOR HOSPITALS 3 (2007), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/survey 
certificationgeninfo/downloads/scletter07-19.pdf. 
 121. Charity Scott, Why Law Pervades Medicine: An Essay on Ethics in Health Care, 14 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB POL‘Y 245, 287 (2000) (internal quotation omitted).  
 122. Barry R. Furrow, Forcing Rescue: The Landscape of Health Care Provides Obligations to 
Treat Patients, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 31 (1993).  
 123. See Creativity is the Key in Discharge Planning, supra note 119, at 97 (observing that 
hospital discharge planners must use ―ingenuity to find a discharge destination for undocumented 
workers who need post-acute care‖ and must ―tap[] into whatever community resources are available‖ 
in order to do so).  
 124. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 125. See supra Part II.D. 
 126. See supra Part II.B. 
 127. For a discussion of EMTALA, Emergency Medicaid, and federal discharge requirements, see 
supra Part II.C.1–2 and Part II.D. 
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A. The Scope of Medical Repatriations 
Medical repatriation occurs when hospitals transport uninsured and 
indigent immigrants to medical facilities outside the United States.
128
 
Repatriations are usually conducted at the transporting hospital‘s expense, 
and, depending on the destination, may by effectuated by ambulance, 
plane, or through a contract with a private repatriation company.
129
 Often 
undertaken without governmental or judicial oversight,
130
 repatriations 
constitute a limited, but consistent, practice at some public and private 
hospitals, particularly those that treat a substantial population of 
immigrants.
131
 For example, St. Joseph‘s Hospital in Phoenix, Arizona, 
repatriates approximately ninety-six immigrants per year.
132
 Repatriations 
are typically initiated when hospitals, after providing stabilizing treatment 
to an immigrant within the mandates of EMTALA, are unable to find a 
rehabilitative facility or nursing home willing to accept an uninsured, 
indigent immigrant who requires long-term care.
133
 Thus, medical 
repatriations have evolved as a creative last resort to reduce the financial 
burdens placed upon over-extended hospitals for the long-term care of 
indigent, nonqualified immigrants.
134
  
Though motivated by common financial concerns, repatriation 
practices vary along two dimensions: (1) the patient‘s immigration status 
and (2) the degree of force applied.  
1. Immigration Status 
Because they are ineligible for nonemergency Medicaid, 
undocumented and indigent immigrants are the primary subjects of 
medical repatriations. Some medical professionals maintain that when 
immigrants have irregular legal statuses, the immigrant‘s country of origin 
ought to assume financial responsibility for the medical needs of its 
 
 
 128. Sontag, supra note 1.  
 129. Id. MexCare is one such repatriation company, which describes itself as ―[a]n alternative 
choice for the care of the unfunded Latin American National.‖ Mexcare, http://mexcare.com (last 
visited May 13, 2010). Mexcare advertises that it ―offer[s] a significant reduction in the cost of unpaid 
services.‖ Mexcare Services, http://mexcare.com/services_MexCare. html (last visited May 13, 2010). 
 130. Vanderpool, supra note 19 (stating that medical repatriations ―are occurring in a legal 
twilight, with little or no governmental oversight‖); see also Patsner, supra note 5 (―For all intents and 
purposes, the practice of repatriation by U.S. hospitals is essentially unregulated.‖). 
 131. Sontag, supra note 1.  
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Sontag, supra note 66. 
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citizens.
135
 Others contend that the federal government should legislatively 
address the burdens associated with the uncompensated care of immigrants 
who are ineligible for long-term Medicaid.
136
  
Yet, even if this argument reflects a rational allocation of limited 
resources, it does not present a complete picture of repatriations: LPRs 
who are barred by Medicaid‘s five-year residency requirement have also 
been subjected to repatriation.
137
 In June 2008, Antonio Torres, a nineteen-
year-old LPR from Mexico, suffered catastrophic injuries in a car accident, 
which rendered him comatose and reliant upon a ventilator at St. Joseph‘s 
Hospital in Arizona.
138
 Over his parents‘ objections, St. Joseph‘s Hospital 
transported Torres across the border to a public hospital emergency room 
in Mexicali.
139
 With the assistance of his family‘s church, Torres was 
transported back to the United States to El Centro Regional Medical 
Center in California, which provided care until he was discharged.
140
  
Even beyond efforts to repatriate LPRs, one hospital attempted to 
―repatriate‖ a full-fledged American citizen.141 In March 2007, Elliott 
Bustamante was born with Down‘s syndrome and a heart defect to a 
Mexican immigrant in Arizona at Tucson‘s University Medical Center 
(UMC).
142
 Notwithstanding the fact that Bustamante was an American 
citizen by virtue of his birth in the United States, UMC stated that the 
hospital‘s policy is to transfer patients to their ―community of residence‖ 
and prepared for the infant‘s removal to a Mexican hospital.143 
Bustamante‘s repatriation was halted only after the Mexican consulate 
 
 
 135. Id. (quoting the vice president of Scottsdale Health in Arizona, who stated, ―Then, it‘s like, 
‗Mexican government, take responsibility for your own citizens!‘‖).  
 136. Wolpin, supra note 60, at 154 (quoting a hospital administrator); see also Sontag, supra note 
1. 
 137. Sontag, supra note 66 (discussing the case of Antonio Torres, an LPR who was repatriated to 
Mexico); see also Daniel Gonzalez, For Some Ill Migrants, Free Care Has a Price, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, 
Aug. 3, 2008, http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/2008/08/03/20080803hospitals 
0803.htmh?&wired (―Not all patients who are sent back are undocumented immigrants. The hospital 
also is sending back legal immigrants who don‘t qualify for long-term Medicaid. Hospital officials 
attribute the practice to stricter laws and tighter controls at the state and federal levels that have made 
it harder for immigrants to obtain non-emergency Medicaid care.‖). 
 138. Sontag, supra note 66. Torres, who had resided in the United States for less than five years, 
was ineligible for Medicaid because of the five-year bar imposed upon newly arrived LPRs. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. The circumstances surrounding Bustamante‘s repatriation are contested: UMC claimed 
that the infant‘s mother initially consented to the transfer and later ―equivocated.‖ Id. In contrast, 
Bustamante‘s mother stated that she was pressured by UMC and was told that the infant would be 
transferred with or without her. Id. 
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provided an attorney to the infant‘s parents and after the police were 
summoned.
144
 When the Arizona Medicaid system approved Bustamante‘s 
care and reimbursed the hospital, UMC abandoned its efforts to repatriate 
the infant.
145
  
2. Degree of Force Applied 
Just as the patients targeted for repatriation may vary, hospitals apply 
differing degrees of force when repatriating patients. While some hospitals 
require consent from the patient or the patient‘s guardian before 
authorizing repatriation,
146
 other hospitals conduct forcible repatriations. 
In the latter cases, the hospital transfers the patient outside the United 
States against the wishes of the patient or the patient‘s legal guardian.147 
For example, UMC would ―‗not confirm whether all past transfers were 
consensual‘‖ and noted that ―‗sometimes we don‘t [require consent].‘‖148  
In other cases, either the hospital authorizing repatriation or the 
company effectuating the removal requires informed consent before 
transferring the patient outside the United States.
149
 Although consensual 
repatriations arguably afford a greater degree of protection to immigrant 
patients, the meaning of consent remains uncertain in this context.
150
 If the 
patient or the patient‘s guardians are undocumented and fear that a failure 
to comply with the hospital‘s directives will result in disclosure of their 
presence to federal immigration authorities, the sincerity of consent is 
questionable.
151
 Similarly, the value of consent diminishes if the hospital 
does not apprise the patient of the possible immigration consequences that 
may attach to leaving the country.
152
  
 
 
 144. Id. Upon Bustamante‘s return to Tucson, UMC sought a judicial order to compel the parents 
to consent to the infant‘s transfer and argued that, given the family‘s failure to transfer the child or pay 
the $28,000 in medical expenses, the baby was trespassing on hospital property. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. (―And, just as some [hospitals] forcibly repatriate patients, others do so only with consent 
. . . .‖). On its website, MexCare explicitly notes that all transfers ―have been done with a signed 
consent of the patient and their Legal Guardian and with extensive communication with the family.‖ 
Press Release, MexCare, The New York Times Gets It Wrong! (Aug. 15, 2008), http://www.mexcare. 
com/pressRelease_Mexcare.html (follow ―Sunday, August 15th, 2008‖ hyperlink under ―2008‖). 
 147. See infra Part IV.B. 
 148. Gonzalez, supra note 137 (quoting UMC‘s attorney).  
 149. Wolpin, supra note 60, at 153–54.  
 150. Id. 
 151. Sontag, supra note 66 (―[C]onsent is a murky concept when patients are told they have no 
alternative.‖). 
 152. Wolpin, supra note 60, at 155 n.17 (―Among the many possible immigration consequences 
that could follow a medical repatriation, permanent residents might find themselves unable to re-enter 
the U.S. after leaving its borders under certain circumstances.‖).  
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Although repatriations have only recently attracted national attention 
and have not been addressed by Congress, the medical community has 
expressed disapproval of forcible repatriations.
153
 In October 2008, the 
California Medical Association passed Resolution 105a-08, stating that it 
―oppose[s] forced deportation of patients.‖154 In November 2009, the 
AMA CEJA issued recommendations on repatriations.
155
 While the report 
acknowledged that physicians should ―use health care resources 
responsibly and can ethically consider compelling arguments . . . to 
discharge a patient whose continued hospitalization is likely to 
compromise the care of other patients,‖ it affirmed that physicians‘ 
―primary ethical obligation‖ is to ensure safe patient discharge, ―without 
regard to socioeconomic status, immigration status, or other clinically 
irrelevant considerations.‖156 Thus, physicians should ―[r]efrain from 
signing a discharge order that would result in involuntary discharge of a 
patient who is not a U.S. citizen to his/her country of origin.‖157  
B. Consequences of Repatriation 
Medical repatriations raise significant health, immigration, and 
personal concerns for immigrant patients. Where patients are repatriated to 
countries lacking adequate medical facilities to address their health care 
needs, serious adverse health consequences may result.
158
 Since his return 
to Guatemala, Mr. Jimenez has received no medical care and has 
experienced ―violent seizures,‖ marked by convulsions, vomiting, and 
unconsciousness.
159
 In addition, repatriations may have detrimental 
immigration consequences.
160
 For LPRs seeking eventual U.S. citizenship, 
repatriation may impede the naturalization process by disrupting their 
continuous U.S. residence, a requirement of naturalization.
161
 Likewise, an 
 
 
 153. Id. at 153 (noting that the medical community has yet to adopt a definition for ―forced‖ 
repatriations).  
 154. Id. (quoting Resolution 105a–08). 
 155. CEJA REPORT, supra note 20. 
 156. Id. at 6. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See Montejo v. Martin Mem‘l Med. Ctr., Inc., 874 So. 2d 654, 657–58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2004) (holding that Martin Memorial violated federal discharge requirements when it transferred a 
patient who suffered traumatic brain injuries to a medical center in Guatemala that lacked facilities 
offering traumatic brain injury rehabilitation). 
 159. Sontag, supra note 1.  
 160. Wolpin, supra note 60, at 155 n.17. 
 161. 8 C.F.R. § 316.2 (2009) sets forth the eligibility requirements for naturalization. Among 
them, the immigrant must establish that he or she ―[h]as resided continuously within the United States 
. . . for a period of at least five years after having been lawfully admitted for permanent residence[.]‖ 
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LPR whose repatriation results in a continuous absence exceeding 180 
days will be regarded as seeking admission upon his return to the United 
States,
162
 and thus will be subject to stringent inadmissibility grounds.
163
 
Equally significant are the potential collateral effects arising from 
repatriations: separation from family and community and the loss of 
livelihood.
164
 Finally, where repatriations are conducted forcibly, they are 
tantamount to deportation, a notably severe consequence.
165
  
 
 
Id. § 316.2(a)(3). In addition, the immigrant must have been ―physically present in the United States 
for at least 30 months of the five years preceding the date of filing the application‖ and must have 
―resided continuously within the United States from the date of application for naturalization up to the 
time of admission to citizenship[.]‖ Id. § 316.2(a)(4), (a)(6). Pursuant to § 316.5(c)(1)(i), an absence 
from the United States for a continuous period of between six months and one year ―shall disrupt the 
continuity of such residence for purposes of this part unless the applicant can establish otherwise to the 
satisfaction of the Service.‖ The immigrant may submit various types of documentation to show that 
his or her extended absence did not disrupt the continuity of residence. Id. § 316.5(c)(1)(i)(A)–(D). An 
absence from the United States for continuous period of one year or more ―shall disrupt the continuity 
of the applicant‘s residence,‖ with no opportunity to present evidence otherwise. Id. § 316.5(c)(1)(ii). 
Thus, if repatriation of an LPR results in an extended absence, it may interfere with the immigrant‘s 
residency requirements for naturalization. 
 162. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(ii) (2006). In addition to the grounds set forth in § 1101(a)(13)(C), 
there is some academic debate concerning the circumstances in which an immigrant is seeking 
admission. The Board of Immigration Appeals has held that a returning LPR who falls within the 
categories described in § 1101(a)(13)(C) will be regarded as seeking admission. See In re Collado-
Munoz, 21 B.I.A. 1061 (1998). Yet, other courts have considered, in addition to these categories, 
whether the absence ―meaningfully interrupted the person‘s permanent residence in the United States.‖ 
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 524 (4th ed. 2005) (citing 
Richardson v. Reno, 994 F. Supp. 1466 (S.D. Fla. 1998)). 
 163. For example, ―[a] single crime of moral turpitude committed at any time may trigger 
inadmissibility whereas it must have been committed within 5 years of lawful admission for it to 
trigger deportability.‖ LEGAL ACTION CTR., PRACTICE ADVISORY: § 211(H) ELIGIBILITY: CASE LAW 
AND POTENTIAL ARGUMENTS 7 (Feb. 19, 2008), available at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/ 
default/files/212elig.pdf (comparing INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(1) with INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)). The 
following scenario illustrates one problem posed by repatriation. Imagine that a family-sponsored 
immigrant was admitted to the United States as an LPR in 2000. In 2004, having not yet met the five-
year residency requirement for Medicaid, the uninsured immigrant was seriously injured in an 
automobile accident and required ongoing care, which no long-term facility would provide. Thus, the 
hospital repatriated the LPR to his country of origin in 2004. The immigrant remained in his country 
for two years, but after recovering, was re-admitted in 2006. In 2008, the immigrant was convicted of 
falsifying his tax return, a crime involving moral turpitude with a possible punishment exceeding one 
year. Because the immigrant, whose repatriation resulted in a lengthy absence, would be regarded as 
seeking admission in 2006, his crime involving moral turpitude would have occurred within five years 
of this second admission, thus triggering deportability under INA § 237. Had he remained 
continuously within the United States, his crime involving moral turpitude would not trigger 
deportation in this instance, as it occurred more than five years after his first admission in 2000. For an 
extensive discussion of issues relating to immigrant entry and admission, see LEGOMSKY, supra note 
162, at 519–25. 
 164. Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of 
Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 512–13 (2007); see also Ng Fung Ho v. White, 
259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (remarking that deportation ―may result also in loss of both property and 
life; or of all that makes life worth living‖). 
 165. Montejo v. Martin Mem‘l Med. Ctr., Inc., 874 So. 2d 654, 658 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1452 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:1429 
 
 
 
 
IV. CAUSES OF ACTION ARISING FROM FORCIBLE REPATRIATIONS 
While immigrants subject to repatriation may confront a variety of 
adverse health and immigration consequences, repatriation also may be 
disadvantageous from the hospital‘s perspective.166 In particular, despite 
their intended goal of reducing medical expenses, repatriations may breach 
federal discharge requirements
167
 and may expose hospitals to tort 
liability.
168
 More significantly, by intruding into the realm of immigration, 
a field occupied by federal law, public and private hospitals alike risk 
violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
169
  
Before evaluating these causes of action, it is necessary to define the 
scope of hospital liability. First, only forcible repatriations should be 
subject to liability. Thus, requiring informed consent by the patient or the 
patient‘s guardians should shield the hospital from liability. Yet in some 
cases, the authenticity of a nominal consent may be challenged, 
particularly if the patient is not aware of the collateral immigration 
consequences resulting from repatriation. Second, to seek redress in a 
federal or state court of the United States, the repatriation must be 
challenged before the patient is transported outside the United States.
170
 
A. Breach of Federal Discharge Requirements 
Although medical repatriations have remained largely outside the 
purview of the courts or immigration authorities,
171
 in Montejo, the 
 
 
(describing the repatriation of Jimenez as ―the transportation (deportation) of Jimenez to Guatemala‖); 
see also LEGOMSKY, supra note 162, at 499 (characterizing deportation as ―a harsh sanction‖ and 
describing the economic and familial hardships that may arise from deportation). 
 166. See Montejo v. Martin Mem‘l Med. Ctr., Inc., 935 So. 2d 1266, 1268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2006) (holding that Montejo could sue and seek punitive damages from Martin Memorial for the false 
imprisonment of Jimenez in the course of Jimenez‘s repatriation).  
 167. See Montejo, 874 So. 2d at 657–58 (finding that the hospital, as a Medicare provider, ―was 
required to comply with federal discharge requirements,‖ and that ―there was no competent substantial 
evidence‖ to support the discharge of an immigrant with traumatic brain injuries to a Guatemalan 
hospital that lacked traumatic brain injury rehabilitation facilities).  
 168. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.  
 169. See Graham & Williams-Harris, supra note 18 (quoting Sonal Ambegaokar, a health policy 
attorney, who notes that where hospitals act as immigration agents by deporting patients, ―immigrants 
may be denied due process‖).  
 170. See Wolpin, supra note 60, at 154 (observing that ―pre-repatriation protection is particularly 
important for non-citizen patients because once outside the country, they will face significant logistical 
obstacles to obtaining legal remedies in U.S. courts and will be unable to challenge any part of their 
repatriation‖).  
 171. See Sontag, supra note 1 (remarking that ―the hospitals are operating in a void, without 
governmental assistance or oversight, leaving ample room for legal and ethical transgressions on both 
sides of the border‖).  
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benchmark case described in Part I, the District Court of Appeal of 
Florida, Fourth District, decided that medical repatriations may breach 
federal patient-discharge requirements.
172
 In reversing the decision of the 
Circuit Court for Martin County, which granted Martin Memorial‘s 
requested order to authorize Jimenez‘s transfer to Guatemala,173 the 
appellate court first observed that ―federal immigration law preempts 
deportation‖;174 consequently, the state trial court ―lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to authorize the transportation (deportation) of Jimenez to 
Guatemala.‖175 Second, because the medical facility in Guatemala lacked 
facilities providing rehabilitation for traumatic brain injuries, the court 
found insufficient ―competent substantial evidence to support Jimenez‘s 
discharge,‖176 which ―was required to comply with federal discharge 
requirements.‖177 Pursuant to the court‘s holding in Montejo, the 
repatriation of immigrants may violate federal discharge requirements if 
the patient is not transferred to an ―appropriate facility,‖ defined ―as one 
which can meet the patient‘s medical needs.‖178 Thus, ―[i]f other courts 
follow this precedent, then Medicaid-participating hospitals will need to 
be particularly careful in investigating the quality and capacity of foreign 
medical facilities before repatriating patients to them.‖179  
B. Tort Liability for False Imprisonment  
Beyond patient discharge violations, the appellate court in Montejo 
determined that an immigrant subject to forcible repatriation may sue the 
hospital in tort for false imprisonment.
180
 In Florida, a plaintiff must 
 
 
 172. Montejo, 874 So. 2d at 658. 
 173. Id. Although Jimenez had already been repatriated at the time of the appeal, the appellate 
court determined that the appeal ―was not moot because similar situations involving extended medical 
care of undocumented immigrants were likely to recur.‖ Patsner, supra note 5. 
 174. Montejo, 874 So. 2d at 656. 
 175. Id. at 658. 
 176. Id.  
 177. Id. at 657. These federal discharge requirements are codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395X(ee) 
(2006) and 42 C.F.R. § 482.43 (2008). Notably, these federal discharge requirements apply to all 
Medicare and Medicaid participating hospitals, regardless of whether the patient himself is eligible for 
Medicare or Medicaid benefits. See Connie A. Raffa, Discharge Planning Issues in Hospitals: 
Steering to Preferred Certified Home Health Agencies and the Risks of Providing Free Discharge 
Planning Services to Hospitals, ARTICLES & LEGAL UPDATES, May 30, 2008, at 1, http://www.arent 
fox.com/pdf_notReady/Discharge%20Planning%20Issues%20in% 20Hospitals.pdf.  
 178. Montejo, 874 So. 2d at 657. 
 179. Wolpin, supra note 60, at 154. 
 180. See Montejo v. Martin Mem‘l Med. Ctr., Inc., 935 So. 2d at 1266, 1268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2006) (holding that Martin Memorial‘s reliance upon a court order, which was later determined to 
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establish four elements in order to maintain a successful false 
imprisonment claim: (1) the ―unlawful detention and deprivation of liberty 
of a person‖; (2) ―against the person‘s will‖; (3) ―without legal authority 
or ‗color of authority‘‖; (4) ―which is unreasonable and unwarranted under 
the circumstances.‖181 Jimenez‘s false imprisonment claim was premised 
upon his non-consensual confinement within an ambulance and airplane in 
the course of his transfer from Martin Memorial to Guatemala.
182
 
Although the trial court dismissed the false imprisonment suit with 
prejudice because the hospital acted under a then-valid court order 
authorizing his repatriation, the appellate court reversed, concluding that 
the hospital‘s reliance upon a voided court order did not immunize the 
hospital from false imprisonment liability.
183
 In remanding the case, the 
appellate court determined that Martin Memorial acted without legal 
authority as a matter of law, but that ―the trier of fact must determine . . . 
whether Martin Memorial‘s actions were unwarranted and unreasonable 
under the circumstances.‖184 In July 2009, on remand to the trial court, a 
jury found for Martin Memorial, concluding that the hospitals actions were 
not ―unreasonable and unwarranted under the circumstances,‖ the fourth 
element of false imprisonment.
185
  
Given that Jimenez ultimately did not prevail in his false imprisonment 
suit, the issue of hospital tort liability for medical repatriations remains 
unresolved. On one hand, immigrant patients may have difficulty 
convincing a jury that a hospital acted unreasonably in conducting a 
forcible repatriation, particularly when the hospital has unsuccessfully 
pursued alternative options, such as placement in a long-term 
rehabilitation facility. On the other hand, the appellate court in Jimenez‘s 
case determined both that state courts lack jurisdiction to issue court 
orders authorizing repatriation and that hospitals cannot rely upon an 
 
 
have been granted without subject matter jurisdiction, did not entitle the hospital to immunity against 
Montejo‘s false imprisonment claim).  
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. In response, Martin Memorial filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, sought 
judgment on the pleadings on two bases: (1) Montejo lacked standing, and (2) because Martin 
Memorial acted pursuant to a then-valid court order, Montejo could not demonstrate an essential 
element of false imprisonment: that his detention was unreasonable and unwarranted. Id.  
 183. Id. Although Martin Memorial contended that ―because it acted in reliance on the court order, 
it should be cloaked with qualified or quasi-judicial immunity to the same extent as that afforded to 
state agents executing the order of a trial court.‖ Id. at 1270. The appellate court rejected this 
argument, noting that the hospital sought to enforce ―a purely private right.‖ Id. at 1271. 
 184. Id. at 1272.  
 185. Deborah Sontag, Jury Rules for Hospital That Deported Patient, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2009, 
at A10. 
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invalidated court order to avoid tort liability.
186
 Consequently, while 
further cases may be needed to measure the success of similar tort 
lawsuits, Jimenez‘s case nevertheless signals that immigrants may pursue 
tort claims against hospitals that conduct forcible repatriations.  
C. Due Process Violations Arising Under the Fourteenth Amendment 
While Montejo suggests that forcible repatriations may expose 
hospitals to liability for federal patient discharge violations and for tort-
based personal injury claims, a yet-untested inquiry is whether 
immigrants, such as Jimenez, who are subjected to forcible medical 
repatriations, may assert claims against the hospitals responsible for 
repatriation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
187
 for the deprivation of due process 
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
188
 To advance 
a successful § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must prove two elements: that a 
person subjected the plaintiff to conduct under the color of state law, and 
that this conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights guaranteed under federal 
law or the U.S. Constitution.
189
 Notably, both § 1983 and the Fourteenth 
Amendment—which protects ―any person‖ from a state-based deprivation 
of life, liberty, and property—apply to all persons, not merely to U.S. 
citizens.
190
 Thus, Fourteenth Amendment due process protections of the 
Constitution apply to all immigrants, whether documented or not, within 
the United States, and § 1983 permits these immigrants to seek damages 
for due process violations by state officers.
191
  
1. Section 1983 Claims Against Public Hospitals 
Where a public hospital seeks to forcibly repatriate an immigrant 
patient, this immigrant likely can establish a successful § 1983 claim. 
First, because ―state employment is generally sufficient to render the 
defendant a state actor‖192 even where a public employee ―abuses the 
 
 
 186. Montejo, 935 So. 2d at 1268. 
 187. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) provides that ―[e]very person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects . . . any citizen of the United States 
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights . . . secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law.‖ 
 188. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1 (providing, in pertinent part, that ―nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law‖).  
 189. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); 15 AM. JUR. 2d Civil Rights § 148 (2000) (discussing the elements 
of a § 1983 claim). 
 190. See supra notes 188 and 189. 
 191. See Bolanos v. Kiley, 509 F.2d 1023, 1025–26 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 192. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 n.18 (1982). 
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position given to him by the State,‖ the employees of a public hospital are 
likely state actors who act under the color of state law when conducting 
official employment duties.
193
 The Supreme Court has determined on 
several occasions that doctors constitute government actors when 
rendering medical care at hospitals operating under state contracts.
194
 
Second, because deportation results in a loss of liberty,
195
 an immigrant is 
likely to prevail in demonstrating that forcible repatriation will deprive the 
immigrant of due process rights secured under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  
Indeed, ―all noncitizens whom the government seeks to expel—even 
those who have not been lawfully admitted—are protected by . . . due 
process.‖196 In the context of deportation, due process generally entitles 
immigrants to certain procedural protections, including an administrative 
hearing before an immigration judge, the right to seek administrative 
review before the Board of Immigration Appeals, and, in certain cases, an 
opportunity for judicial review.
197
 Thus, when a hospital—in an act 
approximating deportation—forcibly transports an immigrant patient 
outside the United States, and when this patient is not afforded prior notice 
or a hearing,
198
 this action violates the immigrant‘s due process rights, 
which are guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. Consistent with this view, 
 
 
 193. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49–50 (1988). In West, an incarcerated patient was treated for a 
torn Achilles tendon by a physician who provided orthopedic treatment to prisoners under a contract 
with the state of North Carolina. Id. at 43–44. When the physician allegedly ―acknowledged that 
surgery would be necessary‖ but ―refused to schedule it,‖ the prisoner filed suit, alleging that the 
physician ―was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs‖ in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment right ―to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.‖ Id. at 44–45. Reversing the Fourth 
Circuit, the Court held that a physician employed by the state to provide medical treatment to state 
prisoners, ―acted under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 when undertaking his duties in 
treating [the prisoner‘s] injury.‖ Id. at 54. Moreover, if the physician ―misused his power by 
demonstrating deliberate indifference to West‘s serious medical needs, the resultant deprivation was 
caused, in the sense relevant for state-action inquiry, by the State‘s exercise of its right . . . to deny him 
a venue independent of the State to obtain needed medical care.‖ Id. at 55. 
 194. See id. at 54; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). For a discussion of these cases, see 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 516 (3d ed. 2006). 
Moreover, ―[t]he Court has made it clear that a government officer is acting under color of law, and is 
a state actor, if he or she is acting in an official capacity, even if the conduct is not authorized by state 
law.‖ Id. Thus, even if the public hospital employees who effect repatriations are not permitted to do 
so within the parameters of state law, they still may be considered state actors if patient repatriations 
are conducted within the scope of their public employment. 
 195. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 194, at 569 (discussing due process protections in the context of 
deportation and exclusion proceedings). 
 196. LEGOMSKY, supra note 162, at 663.  
 197. Id. at 635–43. For an extensive discussion of these procedural protections, see id. at 633–44. 
 198. Arguably, immigrants facing de facto deportations by hospitals should be entitled to the same 
procedural protections afforded to immigrants facing deportation by the federal government. For a 
description of these procedural safeguards, see supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
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the AMA CEJA has noted that ―[f]orcing an immigrant to leave the U.S. is 
a prerogative of the federal government, and should only occur following 
due process, in which the immigrant‘s legal options are exhausted.‖199  
2. Section 1983 Claims Against Private Hospitals 
Given that medical repatriations also are effectuated by private 
hospitals, a related, but more complex question arises: whether immigrants 
may assert a § 1983 claim against the officials of private hospitals that are 
responsible for repatriations. In this case, because the Constitution 
generally does not protect against the violations of private rights by private 
actors,
200
 a successful § 1983 claim will hinge upon a showing that the 
actions of private hospital administrators or physicians constituted state 
action.
201
  
Although the state-action requirement imposes an additional hurdle for 
immigrants who seek relief against private hospitals under § 1983, it is not 
necessarily an insurmountable one.
202
 Pursuant to the public-function 
exception to the state action doctrine, when a private actor fulfills a role 
that is traditionally performed exclusively by the government, the private 
actor may be subject to constitutional limitations.
203
 In 1974, the Supreme 
Court articulated a modern formulation of the public-function exception in 
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Corporation when it stated that there is 
―state action present in the exercise by a private entity of powers 
traditionally exclusively reserved to the [s]tate.‖204 In the immigration 
 
 
 199. CEJA REPORT, supra note 20, at 5. 
 200. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 194, at 507 (―The Constitution‘s protections of individual 
liberties and its requirements for equal protection apply only to the government. Private conduct 
generally does not have to comply with the Constitution.‖). 
 201. For an analysis of the history and policy justifications substantiating the state action doctrine, 
see id. at 510–13. The requirement of state action as a prerequisite to constitutional liability serves 
several purposes. First, state action ―preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of 
federal law and federal judicial power.‖ Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982). 
Second, the state-action doctrine preserves state sovereignty by avoiding ―the imposition of 
responsibility on a State for conduct it could not control.‖ Nat‘l Collegiate Athletic Ass‘n v. 
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988). 
 202. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 194, at 518–39 (discussing exceptions to the state action 
doctrine, including the public-function exception and the entanglement exception). 
 203. Id. at 518–19 (defining the public-function exception to the state action doctrine). For a 
discussion of three notable areas—including private property management, school regulation, and 
electoral process control—in which the Court has found a public function to exist, see id. at 518–26. 
For a student note arguing that, in the immigration context, the border enforcement activities of private 
border patrol groups along the U.S.-Mexico border constitute state action, see Justin A. McCarty, 
Note, The Volunteer Border Patrol: The Inevitable Disaster of the Minuteman Project, 92 IOWA L. 
REV. 1459 (2007). 
 204. 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974). More recently, in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary 
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context, notwithstanding academic debate concerning the constitutional 
underpinnings of the federal government‘s exclusive power to regulate 
immigration,
205
 ―it is settled law today that the power exists.‖206 When 
private hospitals forcibly repatriate immigrant patients—an act that 
effectively results in deportation—this behavior reflects an exercise of 
powers ―traditionally exclusively reserved to the [s]tate‖207 by intruding 
upon the federal government‘s exclusive power to regulate immigration. 
Thus, forcible repatriations arguably fall within the ambit of state action 
for the purpose of a § 1983 lawsuit.  
V. CONCLUSION 
At the crossroads of troublesome immigration and health care policies, 
which restrict access to Medicaid while obligating hospitals to provide 
emergent care, medical repatriations have emerged as a last resort for 
hospitals.
208
 Yet, as this Note discussed, the consequences of repatriation 
may be problematic for both parties involved.
209
 If the medical facility 
outside the United States lacks the means to provide meaningful treatment, 
repatriations may expose immigrant patients to adverse health 
consequences.
210
 Moreover, repatriations will not necessarily accomplish 
 
 
School Athletic Association, 531 U.S. 288, 302 (2001), the Court held that a private association 
regulating high school athletics was a state actor because of the government‘s ―entwinement‖ with its 
activities. However, the entwinement language used in Brentwood Academy does not appear to disturb 
the public function test, as articulated in Metropolitan Edison, but instead signals a possible expansion 
of state action where factual circumstances reveal substantial government involvement. See 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 194, at 526. 
 205. For a discussion of this debate, see LEGOMSKY, supra note 162, at 103–20. The federal 
government‘s power to regulate immigration has been premised on several constitutional provisions, 
including the Commerce Clause, the Naturalization Clause, the Migration or Importation Clause, and 
the War Clause. Id. at 104–07. Furthermore, structural theorists suggest that the structure of the 
Constitution confers upon the federal government a general power over foreign affairs, including the 
specific power to regulate immigration. Id. at 113. The Supreme Court has likewise affirmed the 
federal government‘s power to exclude non-citizens:  
That the government of the United States, through the action of the legislative department, 
can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do not think open to 
controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an incident of every 
independent nation. It is a part of its independence.  
Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 603–04 (1889).  
 206. LEGOMSKY, supra note 162, at 120.  
 207. Metro. Edison, 419 U.S. at 352. 
 208. See Sontag, supra note 1 (―Many hospitals engage in repatriations of seriously injured and ill 
immigrants only as a last resort.‖). 
 209. For a discussion of the problems implicated by forcible repatriations, see Parts III.B and IV. 
 210. In his recent article on the case of Jimenez‘s repatriation to Guatemala, Patsner notes that, 
given the extensive medical resources available within U.S. hospitals as compared to those available in 
Latin and South American countries, ―it is entirely possible that every state court in the U.S. could 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss6/5
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the cost reduction desired by hospitals.
211
 Instead, forcible repatriations 
may expose hospitals to liability for the breach of federal discharge 
requirements, for personal injury lawsuits, and, potentially, for § 1983 
claims arising from due process violations.
212
 While there is no easy 
answer to the question of repatriations, requiring a meaningful informed 
consent is a useful starting point,
213
 which will shield hospitals from 
liability while safeguarding patients, by apprising them of the collateral 
effects of repatriation.  
Caitlin O’Connell  
 
 
determine that comparable medical facilities do not exist in the country of origin for any severely 
injured . . . undocumented immigrant hospitalized in the U.S.‖ See Patsner, supra note 5. 
 211. See supra Part IV (describing the various ways in which hospitals may incur liability through 
the practice of forcible repatriation). 
 212. See supra Part IV. 
 213. This suggestion is consistent with the view expressed by the AMA in November 2009. See 
supra note 20 and accompanying text.  
  J.D. (2010), Washington University School of Law; B.A. English/Psychology (2005), 
Georgetown University. I would like to thank Professor Stephen Legomsky for his invaluable 
guidance in developing and refining this Note. I would also like to thank the editors of the Washington 
University Law Review for their assistance throughout the publication process. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
